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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
David Aaron Knutsen appeals from his convictions for sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
V. M. has a full-scale IQ of 72, which puts her in the borderline intellectual 
functioning range. (Trial Tr., p. 531, L. 5 - p. 533, L. 4.) Her IQ measure "means 
that her intellectual functioning is below average, below low average, and is right 
on the edge of someone in the extremely low range." (Trial Tr., p. 533, Ls. 17-
21.) She has impaired decision-making capacity because of her slow speed in 
both assessing situations requiring a decision and in reasoning through the 
benefits and consequences of her potential choices. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 - p. 
535, L. 17.) She would normally have difficulty making decisions, and that 
difficulty would be aggravated by depression. (Trial Tr., p. 540, L. 21 - p. 541, L. 
7.) Ultimately V.M. is a person over the age of 18 "who is unable to protect 
[herself] from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of mental or physical 
impairments." (Trial Tr., p. 542, L. 1 - p. 544, L. 5.) 
V.M. was living in an Intensive Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. 
(Trial Tr., p. 396, L. 18 - p. 397, L. 18.) Because she became suicidal she was 
moved into the Canyon View mental health facility. (Trial Tr., p. 406, L. 11 - p. 
407, L. 19; p. 410, L. 9- p. 411, L. 16.) At Canyon View she met Knutsen in the 
TV room. (Trial Tr., p. 412, L. 11 - p. 414, L. 23.) 
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Knutsen later came and sat at the same table when V.M. was in the 
cafeteria. (Trial Tr., p. 419, L. 16 - p. 422, 12.) Knutsen started asking "very 
personal questions" such as whether she was a virgin, whether she was wearing 
a bra, and how she, as a virgin, "pleasure[d her]self." (Trial Tr., p. 422, L. 13 - p. 
425, L. 8.) He also told her, in response to her statement that she was a virgin, 
"[W]e can do something about that." (Trial Tr., p. 444, L. 1 - p. 445, L. 12.) 
V.M. was initially flattered by the attention because she had "never really 
had a guy pay attention to [her] like that." (Trial Tr., p. 425, Ls. 10-19.) Flattery 
became fear, however, when, making a suggestive motion with his fingers, 
Knutsen asked how big her nipples were. (Trial Tr., p. 426, L. 1 - p. 427, L. 7.) 
When Knutsen asked to feel her breasts she said "yes" because she "was scared 
at the time." (Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 8-21.) While he felt her breast he "was 
watching the nurses' station, because the nurses could see right into the 
cafeteria." (Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 22-25.) 
After touching her breasts he used his bare foot to "push[] [her] legs open" 
and then rub her vagina under the table. (Trial Tr., p. 428, L. 1 - p. 429, L. 7.) 
Again, while doing this he was "watching the nurses' station the whole time." 
(Trial Tr., p. 430, Ls. 2-11.) 
After rubbing her vagina with his foot, Knutsen asked to see her vagina. 
(Trial Tr., p. 430, Ls. 12-15.) She said yes because she was "scared out of [her] 
mind." (Id.) He took her behind pop machines, so as to be out of the view of the 
nurses. (Trial Tr., p. 430, L. 16 - p. 434, L. 12; State's Exhibits 3, 4.) He asked 
her to pull down her pants, which she did. (Trial Tr., p. 434, L. 13 - p. 435, L. 
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14.) Knutsen told her "he would like that, that was nice" and touched his penis 
over his pants. (Trial Tr., p. 435, 15 - p. 437, L. 9.) He then touched her 
vagina and breasts with his hands. (Trial Tr., p. 437, L. 20 - p. 438, L. 15.) He 
also had her touch his penis through his pants. (Trial Tr., p. 446, L. 20 - p. 447, 
L. 22.) 
Knutsen and V.M. went back to a table in the cafeteria, and Knutsen again 
touched her vagina with his foot, again while watching out for the nurses. (Trial 
Tr., p. 445, L. 16 - p. 446, L. 19.) As V.M. was walking out Knutsen told her to 
wait and, when she did, he again touched her breast and vagina, and told her he 
intended to go "jack off." (Trial Tr., p. 448, L. 14 - p. 449, L. 8.) 
V.M. was "really scared" and "didn't know what to do," but when a nurse 
kept asking her what was wrong she finally told the nurse. (Trial Tr., p. 450, Ls. 
8-22.) 
A grand jury indicted Knutsen for four counts of sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult. (R., pp. 12-14.) Knutsen moved to dismiss the indictment, 
alleging several violations of procedure associated with the grand jury. (R., pp. 
52-55.) He also filed a motion to have the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult 
statute, I.C. § 18-1505B, declared constitutionally void and overbroad. (R., pp. 
57-61.) The district court denied both motions. (R., pp. 183-99, 207-40.) The 
matter proceeded to trial (R., pp. 351-52, 371-76; see generally Trial Tr.), at the 
conclusion of which the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts (R., pp. 
403-05). 
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After trial Knutsen absconded. (R., pp. 417-18.) He was subsequently 
incarcerated in Nevada on felony charges. (R., p. 419.) A warrant for his arrest 
in this case was served on him over two years after the original sentencing 
hearing. (R., p. 430.) The district court ultimately imposed four concurrent 
sentences of 25 years with 18 years determinate. (R., pp. 487-92.) Knutsen filed 
a notice of appeal, timely from entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 494-96.) 
4 
ISSUES 
Knutsen's statement of the issues is found in the Appellant's brief at page 
7. Due to its length it is not reproduced here. The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The district court determined that because its order started the grand jury 
term once it was "selected and convened," the time to measure the term 
was from when the grand jury first met to consider possible indictments 
instead of some other time. Has Knutsen failed to show error in the 
district court's interpretation of its own order? 
2. Has Knutsen failed to show that the sexual abuse of vulnerable adults 
statute is constitutionally deficient, either on its face or as applied to his 
conduct? 
3. Has Knutsen failed to show error in the district court's rejection of his 
proposed jury instruction that consent was a defense to a charge of sexual 
abuse of a vulnerable adult? 
4. Is Knutsen's claim that the evidence is insufficient to support his 
convictions without merit? 
5. Has Knutsen failed to show fundamental error in his four convictions 
based on a claim of double jeopardy? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Knutsen Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
The Grand Jury Acted Within Its Term 
A. Introduction 
On November 13, 2008, the district court issued an order that a grand jury 
be "summoned and convened in Twin Falls County, on the 14th day of November 
2008." (Order Summoning and Convening Grand Jury, p. 1 (Augmentation) 
(hereinafter "Order").) The Order also states that "once selected and convened, 
the grand jury shall serve a term of four months until discharged by the Court." 
(Order, p. 2.) The judge instructed the grand jury that this meant they would be 
meeting on alternate Wednesdays starting December 3, 2008 and ending on 
March 25, 2009. (Grand Jury Tr., p. 10, Ls. 5-17.) The grand jury returned the 
indictment in this case on its last meeting, on March 25, 2009. (R., p. 12.) 
Knutsen moved to dismiss, asserting the grand jury "acted without 
jurisdiction" because it met "after the expiration of the four month term specified" 
in the court's order convening the grand jury. (R., p. 53.) The district court 
rejected this claim for two reasons. First, it concluded that, pursuant to the order 
convening it, the grand jury began its four-month term when it was "selected and 
convened," which happened at its first post-selection convening, on December 3, 
2008. (R., pp. 210-11.) Second, it concluded that "even if this grand jury 
convened outside of the four-month window" of the written order, it "still had 
jurisdiction" because the court orally extended the term when it ordered the jury 
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to meet on March 25, 2009, which was within the six month jurisdictional period 
allowed by law. (R., pp. 211-14.) 
Although the district court concluded the grand jury had jurisdiction on two 
bases, Knutsen challenges only the first on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-12.) 
This Court must therefore affirm the district court on the unchallenged basis for 
its ruling. Moreover, even if both bases are reviewed on the merits, Knutsen has 
failed to show any error by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate court's] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal." State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
The interpretation of an unambiguous court order presents a question of 
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Suchan v. Suchan, 113 
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986); Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie 
Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App. 
1993). The interpretation of an ambiguous court order presents a question of 
fact. Suchan, 113 Idaho at 106, 741 P.2d at 1293. Where the order is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, the appellate court must accept 
the trial court's interpretation, particularly when the trial court is interpreting its 
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own order, unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous. KL at 107-08, 7 41 P .2d 
at 1294-95 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court's Ruling Must Be Affirmed On The Unchallenged 
Holding That It Orally Ordered The Grand Jury To Meet On March 25, 
2009 
Where a basis for a ruling by a district court is unchallenged on appeal, 
the appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. See State v. Goodwin, 
131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). Here Knutsen does 
not challenge the district court's conclusion that it orally ordered the grand jury to 
meet on March 25, 2009, within the six months allowed by law, and therefore the 
grand jury had jurisdiction on that date. (Compare R., pp. 211-14 (holding that 
the grand jury had jurisdiction because the court orally ordered it to convene on 
March 25, 2009, within the six months allowed by law), with Appellant's brief, pp. 
8-12 (failing to acknowledge or address the district court's holding that by orally 
ordering the grand jury to meet on March 25, 2009 such meeting was within its 
ordered term).) The district court's ruling must be affirmed on the unchallenged 
basis. 
D. Knutsen Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Interpretation Of Its 
Own Order As Starting The Term Of The Grand Jury On December 3, 
2008 And Discharging It After March 25, 2009 
Even if this Court chooses to review the merits of the order denying the 
motion to dismiss, no error is shown. A grand jury lacks jurisdiction to issue an 
indictment outside its legal term of service. State v. Dalling, 128 Idaho 203, 206, 
911 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1996). "A grand jury shall serve until discharged by the 
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court but no grand jury shall serve more than six (6) months unless specifically 
ordered by the court which summoned the grand jury." I.C.R. 6.8. There is no 
dispute that the grand jury returned the current indictment within six months. 
Rather, the only issue presented is whether the grand jury had been "discharged 
by the court" prior to March 25, 2009. Review of the record clearly shows it was 
not. 
First, the grand jury was not discharged by the Order summoning it. The 
Order provided that a grand jury "be summoned and convened" on November 14, 
2008. (Order, p. 1.) It further ordered that the grand jury serve a four month 
term "once selected and convened." (Order, p. 2.) The difference in the wording 
shows that the term did not start with the summoning and selection of the grand 
jury, but only after the grand jury had been "selected." The November 14, 2008 
hearing at which the grand jury was selected was not contemplated to be within 
the term specified in the order. Thus, the term started the first time the grand jury 
convened post-selection, on December 3, 2008. The district court's ruling is 
supported by the plain language of the order and, to the extent the language is 
ambiguous, the district court's interpretation of its own order requires deference.1 
Moreover, there is no basis in the record to believe that the court 
discharged the grand jury prior to March 25, 2009. Even if the written order could 
be interpreted as starting the four-month term on November 14, 2008, the court's 
1 That the district court interpreted it order from the beginning as starting the four 
month term with the first meeting to hear potential cases is demonstrated by the 
fact the court instructed the grand jury to meet in the four months from December 
to March. 
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instruction to the grand jury to meet on March 25, 2009, cannot be interpreted as 
anything other than the court's intention that the grand jury not be discharged 
prior to that date. In short, there is nothing in the record indicating that the grand 
jury was in fact discharged prior to March 25, 2009. 
Because the Rule provides that the grand jury serves for six months or 
until discharged, and because the grand jury returned the present indictment 
within six months and without having been discharged, Knutsen's argument the 
grand jury lacked jurisdiction is without merit. 
11. 
Knutsen Has Shown No Constitutional Infirmity Of The Sexual Abuse Of A 
Vulnerable Adult Statute 
A Introduction 
Knutsen throws the constitutional kitchen sink at the sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult statute, asserting it is unconstitutionally overbroad (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 13-25); infringes upon his due process right to private, consensual 
conduct as applied (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-26); violated his right to substantive 
due process (Appellant's brief, pp. 27-29); violated his right to equal protection 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30); is void for vagueness (Appellant's brief, pp. 30-40); 
and is vague as applied (Appellant's brief, pp. 40-43). Of these constitutional 
arguments, only the claims that the statute is overboard, void for vagueness, and 
vague as applied are preserved. (R., pp. 183-99.) Knutsen has failed to show 
that the district court erred in rejecting them. As to the claims presented for the 
first time on appeal (that application of the statute violated his rights to privacy, 
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substantive due process, and equal protection), Knutsen has failed to show 
fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de nova. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute. kl The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality. kl 
C. Knutsen Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determinations 
That The Sexual Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult Statute Is Not Void For 
Vagueness, Overbroad, Or Vague As Applied 
1. The Statute Is Not Void For Vagueness 
"A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute 
or regulation under which it is obtained 'fails to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it 
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement."' F.C.C. v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., _ U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). Thus, "the void-for-
vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary 
and discriminatory prosecutions." Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, _, 
130 S.Ct. 2896, 2933 (2010). Statutes, however, have a "strong presumption of 
validity" and the court must, if it can, "construe, not condemn" them. kl, 130 
11 
S.Ct. at 2928 (internal quotes and cites omitted). That "close cases can be 
envisioned" is insufficient to "render[] a statute vague" because the state must 
still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Williams, 553 
U.S. 285, 305-06 (2008). Even if a statute's "outermost boundaries" are 
"imprecise," such uncertainty has "little relevance" if the "appellant's conduct falls 
squarely within the 'hard core' of the statute's proscriptions." Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); see also Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2933 (citing 
Broadrick). Furthermore, sufficient clarity "may be supplied by judicial gloss on 
an otherwise uncertain statute." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 
(1997). 
There is nothing vague about the sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult 
statute, much less vagueness rising to the level of rendering the statute beyond 
construction and requiring condemnation. The statute prohibits "any person" 
from "caus[ing] or hav[ing] sexual contact with a vulnerable adult" with the "intent 
of arousing, appealing to or gratifying" his or her own or another's "lust, passion 
or sexual desires." I.C. § 18-1505B. The phrases "any person" and "caus[ing] or 
hav[ing] sexual contact" and the language describing sexual intent are straight-
forward and clear, and do not seem to be at issue here. 
The definition of the phrase "vulnerable adult" appears to be the part of the 
statute Knutsen challenges: 
a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to 
protect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical 
or mental impairment which affects the person's judgment or 
behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or 
capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions regarding 
his person, funds, property or resources. 
12 
LC. § 18-1505(4)(e). Although this definition is broad (it applies to several types 
of abuse or exploitation of vulnerable adults) it is not vague. A person is a 
"vulnerable adult" if he or she is 18 or over, has a "physical or mental impairment" 
that affects "judgment or behavior" such that the person "lacks sufficient 
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions 
regarding his person, funds, property or resources" and the person is "unable to 
protect himself." A person of ordinary intelligence is provided notice of what this 
statute prohibits. 
Knutsen makes no actual claim that the language of the statute is vague. 
Rather, he merely asserts that the prosecutor's argument was vague, that there 
are hypothetical scenarios where he believes the application of the statute is not 
clear, and complains about the lack of a scienter or fiduciary capacity element. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 37-40.) These arguments show, at best, that the 
"outermost boundaries" of this statute may be "imprecise" or that "close cases 
can be envisioned." Neither of these is sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
validity that must be applied to this statute. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 305-06; 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608. The statute clearly prohibits the sexual abuse of 
adults who cannot protect themselves from such abuse due to physical or mental 
impairment that makes them vulnerable because of reduced capacity. It is not 
vague, much less void-for-vagueness. 
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2. The Statute Is Not Overbroad 
"To succeed in a typical facial attack, [the appellant] would have to 
establish that no set of circumstances exist under which [the statute] would be 
valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep." United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (internal quotations omitted).2 There is a 
"second type of facial challenge," established by demonstrating that a 
"substantial number" of the challenged statute's applications are 
"unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," but 
such applies only in "the First Amendment context." ~ at 473 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
Although Knutsen argues for application of the second type of facial 
challenge, the constitutional right he invokes is not grounded in the First 
Amendment, but rather in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-79 (2003).3 "The fact that 
2 The Supreme Court of the United States has not resolved which of these two 
legal standards "applies in a typical case." Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. Knutsen 
claims the Idaho Supreme Court has erred by adopting the first standard, that "no 
set of circumstances exists" under which the statute would be valid, and that 
cases applying that standard should be overruled. (Appellant's brief, pp. 32-35.) 
Absent resolution of that issue by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Knutsen has failed to show grounds for reversing Idaho precedent. Regardless, 
his claim fails under either standard. 
3 Knutsen engages a "bait and switch," asserting that the right he is invoking is 
also protected by the First Amendment right of association. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 19-20.) While the authority he asserts is sufficient to establish that there is a 
First Amendment right of association, he cites nothing indicating it protects 
sexual contact of the sort at issue here. The only relevant authority he cites for 
constitutional protection of private, consensual sex by adults is Lawrence 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-19), which, as noted, is rooted in due process, not the 
First Amendment. 
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[a statute] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of 
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not 
recognized an 'overbreadth' challenge outside the limited context of the First 
Amendment." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Because 
there is no viable claim that the statute in question potentially violates the First 
Amendment, Knutsen bears the burden of demonstrating that there is "no set of 
circumstances" where the statute may be constitutionally applied or that "the 
statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep." 
Knutsen has not tried to bear this burden, and in fact any effort would 
prove futile. In the case of a truly non-consenting victim the statute may be 
constitutionally applied. State v. Hamlin,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 
1687137, at p. *8 (Idaho App., 2014); State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 262, 192 
P .3d 1085, 1086 (Ct. App. 2008). Because there is no viable First Amendment 
challenge to the statute, Knutsen must show that the statute is unconstitutional in 
all its applications or that it has no plainly legitimate sweep. Because he has 
neither tried nor succeeded in bearing that burden his argument must be 
rejected. 
3. The Statute Is Not Vague As Applied 
To show that the statute is vague "as applied" a defendant "must show 
that the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice 
that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to 
arrest him." State v. Ruggiero,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 1660728, 
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at p. *8 (Idaho App., 2014) (citing State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 
126, 132 (2003)). The question is whether the statute, "read as a whole," 
"provides fair notice of the conduct that it prohibits." State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 
972, _, 318 P.3d 962, 973 (Ct. App. 2014). Furthermore, "a statute need not 
provide absolute precision in describing the exact conduct that it covers; only fair 
notice understandable by persons of ordinary intelligence is required." kl 
In Ruggiero the "plain language of the statute provided fair notice that it 
was illegal for Ruggiero to prepare false documents and submit them to the 
magistrate with the intent they be produced in his criminal proceeding 'as true 
and genuine' for a 'fraudulent or deceitful purpose .... " kl Likewise, in this case 
the plain language of the statute gave ample notice that it was unlawful to have 
sexual contact with a vulnerable adult. This statute is similar to sex crimes based 
on the age of the victim, such as statutory rape or lewd and lascivious conduct 
with a minor: That the age of the victim may not have been readily apparent to 
the defendant does not render those statutes vague. Likewise, even assuming 
the veracity of Knutsen's claim that the facts as he understood them did not 
provide notice that C.M. was a vulnerable adult,4 such did not make the notice 
provided by the plain language of the statute vague. Knutsen's claim that the 
statute is vague as applied to him is without merit. 
4 Of course the state disputes Knutsen's factual claims. V.M.'s mental limitations 
would have been readily apparent and the fact Knutsen encountered her in a 
mental health facility was at least an indication she may have a reduced capacity. 
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D. Knutsen Has Failed To Show, Pursuant To The Fundamental Error 
Standard, That Application Of The Statute Violated His Rights To 
Consensual Sexual Activity, Substantive Due Process, And Equal 
Protection 
Although Knutsen's motion stated it was based on "the right to due 
process of law and equal protection" (R., pp. 57, 77), the only due process claims 
asserted in the arguments supporting the motion were vagueness (facial and as 
applied) and overbreadth (R., pp. 57-61, 77-86), and "equal protection" is 
nowhere else mentioned (Id.). The district court also concluded that there were 
three issues presented by Knutsen; namely that the statute was void for 
vagueness, vague as applied, and overbroad. (R., p. 138 (identifying three 
issues raised by the motion to dismiss).) Knutsen did not object to the scope of 
the district court's ruling on his motion or request clarification or reconsideration. 
(See generally, R.) 
On appeal Knutsen argues that holding him criminally accountable 
infringed upon his due process right to private, consensual conduct (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 25-26); violated his right to substantive due process (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 27-29); and violated his right to equal protection (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30). 
Because these claims were neither raised nor ruled on below, they are not 
preserved for appellate review. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. 
MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 491, 224 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009) ("Even 
though an issue was argued to the court, to preserve an issue for appeal there 
must be a ruling by the court."); see also Kolas v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 
Idaho 346, 354, 127 P.3d 962, 970 (2005) ("To properly preserve an issue for 
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appeal, one must either receive an adverse ruling on the issue or raise it in the 
court below."). 
In a criminal case, where an issue is not preserved it may only be 
reviewed for fundamental error. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 924, 245 P.3d 
961, 976 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must show a violation 
of an unwaived constitutional right; that the error is clear or obvious; and that the 
error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. lg_,_ at 226, 245 P.3d at 978; 
State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Knutsen has not attempted, much less succeeded, to show fundamental error. 
1. The Record Does Not Establish Knutsen Was Engaged In 
Constitutionally Protected Conduct 
The state may not criminalize the private sexual conduct of two adu Its, 
undertaken "with full and mutual consent from each other." Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). "However, Lawrence makes clear that this 
constitutional protection does not apply to nonconsensual acts, including sex with 
those incapable of consenting." State v. Hamlin, _ Idaho_, _ P.3d _, 
2014 WL 1687137, at p. *7 (Idaho App., 2014). Likewise, sexual conduct that 
occurs in public is not protected. State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 263-64, 192 
P.3d 1085, 1087-88 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Knutsen claims that the "trial reveals that two adults ... engaged in 
consensual sexual contact." (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) This claim is viable only if 
this Court declines to read the transcript. V.M. was in the borderline intellectual 
functioning range and "right on the edge" of the extremely low range. (Trial Tr., 
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p. 531, L. 5 - p. 533, L. 21.) Her decision-making capacity was impaired by slow 
speed in both assessing situations requiring a decision and in reasoning through 
the benefits and consequences of her potential choices. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 -
p. 535, L. 17.) Her already impaired decision-making skills were further impaired 
by depression. (Trial Tr., p. 540, L. 21 - p. 541, L. 7; p. 406, L. 11 - p. 407, L. 
19; p. 410, L. 9 - p. 411, L. 16.) Ultimately V.M. is a person over the age of 18 
"who is unable to protect [herself] from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of 
mental or physical impairments." (Trial Tr., p. 542, L. 1 - p. 544, L. 5.) She 
testified herself that she said yes to Knutsen's aggressive sexual advances 
despite being "scared out of [her] mind." (Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 8-21; p. 430, Ls. 
12-15; p. 450, Ls. 8-22.) The evidence clearly shows she acquiesced from a 
combination of Knutsen's pressure and her mental and emotional incapacity. 
Knutsen's claim that the evidence establishes the opposite is specious. 
Moreover, Knutsen makes no claim that the conduct was private. Rather, 
evidence conclusively establishes that the behavior was in the cafeteria of a 
mental health facility where Knutsen kept a constant watch out for the nurses. 
(Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 22-25; p. 430, Ls. 2-11; p. 445, L. 16 - p. 446, L. 19.) The 
only thing keeping the claim that the conduct was private from being specious is 
Knutsen's failure to make it. 
Knutsen aggressively and in a predatory fashion convinced a young 
woman suffering mental and emotional disabilities to acquiesce to sexual contact 
in the cafeteria of a mental health facility. His claim he had a constitutional right 
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to do so is demeaning to the Constitution. He has failed to present the whiff of a 
valid claim of fundamental error. 
2. Knutsen Has Shown No Viable Claim Of A Violation Of His Rights 
To Substantive Due Process 
Knutsen invokes substantive due process based on his "right to privacy" 
under Lawrence, admits the state has a "legitimate purpose in protecting all 
citizens from nonconsensual sex," but claims the statute "simply does not meet 
the State's legitimate purpose because it just defines an entire group of people 
as incapable of consenting to sexual contact." (Appellant's brief, pp. 27-29.) 
Knutsen thus argues for application of the "strict scrutiny" test, with its attendant 
requirement that the statute employ the least restrictive means to effectuate the 
state interest. (Id.) This argument fails because, as set forth above, there is no 
constitutionally protected conduct in this case. Lawrence specifically excluded 
nonconsensual sex such as is at issue in this case. Hamlin, _ Idaho _, _ 
P.3d _, 2014 WL 1687137, at p. *7; Cook, 146 Idaho at 263-64, 192 P.3d at 
1087-88. "Legislative acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ 
suspect classifications are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome 
only by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irregularity." State v. Bennett, 142 
Idaho 166, 169, 125 P.3d 522, 525 (2005) (internal quotation and citations 
omitted). Because Knutsen had no constitutional right (fundamental or 
otherwise) to sexually abuse a vulnerable adult, Knutsen must demonstrate that 
there is no rational basis for prohibiting the sexual abuse of vulnerable adults. 
State v. Sherman, _ Idaho_, P.3d _, 2014 WL 1281723, at pp. *2-3 
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(Idaho App., 2014). Knutsen makes no such claim, nor could he prevail on it if 
he did. Having failed to establish a violation of his substantive due process 
rights, much less one that is clear on the record and prejudicial, Knutsen has 
failed to establish fundamental error. 
3. Knutsen Has Failed To Show A Viable Claim Of A Violation Of His 
Equal Protection Rights 
The Supreme Court of the United States "has long held that a 
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceedings along suspect 
lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational 
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose." Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., _ U.S._ 2073, 
132 S.Ct. 2073, 2079-80 (2012) (internal quotes and citations omitted, ellipse 
original). Thus, the "first step in an equal protection analysis is to identify the 
classification at issue." Bagley v. Thomason, 155 Idaho 193, _, 307 P .3d 
1219, 1224 (2013) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Where a party 
claiming an equal protection violation has failed to identify a classification, the 
Court will not review that claim because "this Court does not consider issues not 
supported by argument or authority." & (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
The classification Knutsen identifies is a distinction between married and 
unmarried people. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30.) He admits his claim that the 
statute distinguishes between married and unmarried people is not based on 
statutory language, but instead on a claim that the legislature "presumed" that 
married adults were "exempted from the law." (Id.) Having failed to identify an 
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actual classification created by the law, Knutsen has failed to identify a 
classification that the Court can consider, much less a classification that rises to 
an equal protection fundamental error. 
111. 
Knutsen Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Rejection Of His Proposed 
Consent Defense Instruction 
A. Introduction 
When invited to put any objection to the proposed jury instructions on the 
record, Knutsen's counsel referenced "constitutional issues" that had been 
"litigated" and were subject to the district court's previously issued opinion. (Trial 
Tr., p. 636, Ls. 4-13.) Counsel "object[ed] specifically to any instructions having 
to do with strict liability or any instruction having to do with the defendant not 
needing to know that a person has mental deficiencies and is, therefore, unable 
to give informed consent." (Trial Tr., p. 636, Ls. 13-20.) The district court 
instructed the jury that "it is not a defense ... that V.M. may have consented to 
the alleged conduct." (R., p. 393.) 
On appeal "Knutsen asserts that the district court should not have 
provided the consent defense instruction." (Appellant's brief, p. 44. 5) However, 
Knutsen has failed to establish that the instruction in any way misstated the law. 
He has therefore failed to show error. 
5 Knutsen argues in the alternative that the district court "should have utilized the 
consent instruction applicable to rape involving a person of unsound mind." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 44, 47-48.) Knutsen did not request that this instruction be 
used at trial, however, and on appeal does not claim its omission amounts to 
fundamental error. The alternative argument should, therefore, be disregarded 
as unpreserved. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). Whether a jury was properly instructed is a 
question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. 
Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657,659, 8 P.3d 652,654 (2000)). 
C. Knutsen Has Failed To Show That Consent Is A Defense To Sexual 
Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult 
It is a felony for "any person" to have "sexual contact with a vulnerable 
adult" "with the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion or 
sexual desires of such person." I.C. § 18-15058(1). The jury was instructed on 
these elements. (R., pp. 385-88.) The jury was also instructed with the statutory 
definition of the phrase "vulnerable adult." (R., p. 389.) In order to find Knutsen 
guilty it had to find that Knutsen engaged in specific acts of touching (touching 
V.M.'s genitals with his foot, touching her genitals with his hand, touching her 
breasts with his hand, and having her touch his genitals with her hand), that such 
touching was with sexual intent, and that V.M. was an adult who was "unable to 
protect herself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental 
impairment" which affected her "judgment or behavior to the extent" that she 
lacked "sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate or 
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implement decisions about her person, funds, property, or resources." (R., pp. 
385-89.) 
Lacking from the statute is any defense of consent. That V.M. said yes 
because she was "scared out of [her] mind" did not provide Knutsen with a 
defense. (Trial Tr., p. 430, Ls. 12-15.) The district court properly instructed the 
jury that evidence that V.M. said yes to her own abuse was not a defense 
available to Knutsen under the plain language and elements of the statute. 
Knutsen first argues that V.M.'s testimony that she said yes was a defense 
because "the only time that consent of victim [sic] is no defense is when the 
charge involves a child under age." (Appellant's brief, p. 46.) As authority for 
this broad claim Knutsen cites State v. Herr, 97 Idaho 783, 554 P .2d 961 ( 1976), 
and State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 924 P.2d 599 (1996). (Appellant's brief, p. 46.) 
In Herr the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to give, in a trial 
for lewd conduct with a child, an instruction on an included offense of fornication 
on the grounds that fornication was not an included offense because it had an 
element, consent, not present in the crime of lewd conduct with a child. Herr, 97 
Idaho at 786-87, 554 P.2d 964-65. In Oar the Court held that consent is not a 
defense to a charge of sexual battery of a child. Oar, 129 Idaho 340, 924 P.2d at 
602. These cases do not support the argument that the legislature was required 
to or in fact did include consent as a defense to sexual abuse of a vulnerable 
adult. 
Knutsen next argues that had the court not instructed the jury that consent 
was not a defense he would have had "more room to argue the meaning of 
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vulnerable adult as it relates to the charges, and whether or not V.M. had the 
capacity to protect herself from abuse." (Appellant's brief, p. 46.6) The state is 
unaware of any legal basis for a "more room to argue" for an acquittal legal 
standard, and Knutsen cites no legal authority for it. A defendant is not entitled 
to an erroneous statement of the law, see State v. Johns, 122 Idaho 873, 881, 
736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987), regardless of how much it would improve, from his 
perspective, his closing argument. 
Knutsen has cited no law indicating that he was not guilty of sexual abuse 
of a vulnerable adult because he got the victim to say "yes" in the course of 
sexually abusing her. Because the instructions were accurate statements of the 
law, and Knutsen has failed to show otherwise, Knutsen has failed to show 
error. 7 
6 Knutsen likewise argues he was "unable to argue that V.M. had the ability to 
protect herself from sexual contact." (Appellant's brief, p. 48.) This claim is 
false. The jury was instructed that before it could convict it would have to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that V.M. was "unable to protect herself from abuse, 
neglect or exploitation." (R., p. 389.) The instruction that consent was not a 
defense in no way prevented Knutsen from arguing the elements of the crime. 
7 Because the jury found V.M. to be a vulnerable adult and the evidence shows 
that V.M. said "yes" under conditions that show she did not give knowing and 
voluntary consent, any error is also harmless. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 
222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010) (error will be deemed harmless if, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it did not contribute to the conviction). 
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IV. 
Knutsen Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Of His Guilt Is Insufficient To 
Support His Convictions 
A. Introduction 
Knutsen argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict because the jury could not reasonably conclude that V.M. was unable to 
protect herself from abuse. (Appellant's brief, pp. 49-52.) In making this 
argument Knutsen cites to evidence he believes supports a conclusion other than 
that reached by the jury, but fails to acknowledge evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict. (R., p. 51.) Review of the evidence supporting the jury's conclusion 
shows more than substantial evidence supporting the verdict. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
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698, 701, 946 P .2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761 , 735 P .2d 
at 1072. 
C. Knutsen Has Failed To Show Any Inadequacy In The Evidence 
To show that V.M. was a vulnerable adult the state had the burden of 
proving that V.M. was "unable to protect [herself] from abuse, neglect or 
exploitation." I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). The evidence amply supports the jury's 
finding on this matter. 
V. M. was in the borderline intellectual functioning range with an overall IQ 
score of 72, which is "right on the edge" of the extremely low range. (Trial Tr., p. 
531, L. 5 - p. 533, L. 23.) Her decision-making capacity was impaired by slow 
speed in both assessing situations requiring a decision and in reasoning through 
the benefits and consequences of her potential choices. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 -
p. 535, L. 17.) V.M.'s already impaired decision-making skills were further 
impaired by depression. (Trial Tr., p. 540, L. 21 - p. 541, L. 7; p. 406, L. 11 - p. 
407, L. 19; p. 410, L. 9 - p. 411, L. 16.) "[l]n a decision that's going to be 
complex, where there's a lot of information or a lot of things to consider, [for] 
someone with an IQ of 72 it's going to be quite challenging for them without 
some extra assistance." (Trial Tr., p. 535, Ls. 9-13.) 
The psychological evidence that V.M. would be overwhelmed by having to 
make difficult or complex decisions is confirmed by V.M.'s testimony that she 
said yes to Knutsen's aggressive sexual advances despite being "scared out of 
[her] mind." (Trial Tr., p. 427, Ls. 8-21; p. 430, Ls. 12-15; p. 450, Ls. 8-22.) 
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Finally, if the above were not enough, Dr. Hogland specifically testified 
that, in her professional opinion, V.M. is a vulnerable adult because she meets 
the statutory criteria of being a person over the age of 18 "who is unable to 
protect [herself] from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of mental or 
physical impairments." (Trial Tr., p. 542, L. 22 - p. 544, L. 5. 8) The evidence 
supports the finding that V.M. was incapable of protecting herself from sexual 
abuse by Knutsen because of her mental limitations. 
In claiming otherwise, Knutsen first cites Dr. Hogland's testimony that with 
education V.M. would be able to understand what sexual interaction is. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 51; compare Trial Tr., p. 552, L. 17 - p. 555, L. 15.) Of 
course evidence that V.M. has the ability to learn in the future what sexual 
interaction is directly refutes any claim that she possessed that understanding at 
the time of the crime. This evidence actually cuts for the state's position. 
Knutsen points out that V.M.'s full IQ score is two points above formal 
classification as mentally retarded and that her verbal subtest score is 81, in the 
low normal range. (Appellant's brief, p. 51.) The statute, however, does not 
require formal classification as mentally retarded. 1.C. § 18-15056(1). 
Furthermore, the clinical psychologist testified that the more relevant IQ subtest 
score was in processing speed, which was 71, and indicated that V.M. would 
have trouble making decisions. (Trial Tr., p. 533, L. 24 - p. 538, L. 17.) The 
8 This testimony belies Knutsen's claim "[t]here was no evidence that V.M. should 
have been qualified as a vulnerable adult because she was unable to protect 
herself from abuse due to her mental impairment." (Appellant's brief, p. 51.) 
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evidence regarding V.M.'s IQ supports the jury's verdict, rather than showing it 
unreasonable. 
Knutsen finally points out evidence that V.M. graduated from high school 
and argues she "received Bs and Cs in the more difficult classes." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 51.) However, in high school she mostly took "[s]pecial ed resource 
classes" that were "not ... normal classes" but were for "people that had learning 
disabilities." (Trial Tr., p. 403, Ls. 18-23.) She got Bs and Cs in her non-special 
education classes, such as "[c]ooking class and history class" and "computer 
classes" (Trial Tr., p. 460, Ls. 4-23), but such achievement hardly removes her 
from being vulnerable to predators like Knutsen. 
Ultimately Knutsen's argument is merely that there is evidence in the 
record that he believes supports his argument that V.M. was not unable to 
protect herself from sexual abuse. Simply ignoring the considerable evidence to 
the contrary, however, does not render the jury verdict unreasonable or 
unsupported by evidence. When all of the evidence is considered the jury verdict 
is eminently reasonable. 
V. 
Knutsen Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In His Multiple Punishments For 
Multiple Crimes 
A. Introduction 
Knutsen asserts, for the first time on appeal, that his four crimes are in fact 
"one offense" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
52-55.) He has failed to show any violation of his rights against double jeopardy, 
much less fundamental error. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). 
C. Knutsen Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Imposing Four 
Sentences Upon His Four Convictions 
"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no 
person shall 'be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb."' Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980). "At its root, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause forbids the duplicative prosecution of a defendant for the 'same 
offense."' United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 385 (1992). The Double 
Jeopardy Clause "serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors," but 
the legislature "remains free" to "define crimes and fix punishments." Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Thus, the test for what constitutes "the same 
offense" is "one of legislative intent." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778-
79 (1985). 
30 
"'There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from 
punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction 
which it has power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction."' 
Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779 (emphasis original) (quoting Albrecht v. United States, 
273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927)). If the "applicable [Idaho] statutes" make the different 
sexual contacts in this case "a single offense," then the double jeopardy bar 
applies. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 169. If, however, "the [Idaho] legislature 
provided that" each act of sexual touching is itself a crime, we "have a different 
case." kl at 169 n.8. Application of the legal standard articulated by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to the facts of this case shows that Knutsen 
was properly charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for four separate crimes. 
The grand jury indicted Knutsen on four counts of sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult. Count I alleged that Knutsen "did cause or have sexual contact 
... not amounting to lewd conduct" by "touching V.M.'s genitals with his foot." 
(R., p. 13.) Count II alleged that Knutsen "did commit a lewd and\or lascivious 
act" by "touching V.M.'s genitals with his hand." (R., p. 13.) Count Ill alleged that 
Knutsen "did cause or have sexual contact ... not amounting to lewd conduct" by 
"touching V.M.'s breasts with his hand(s)." (R., p. 13.) Count IV alleged that 
Knutsen "did commit a lewd and\or lascivious act" by "having V.M. touch his 
genitals with her hand." (R., p. 14.) Counts II and IV were charged under I.C. § 
18-1505B(1)(a), while Counts I and Ill were charged under I.C. § 18-15058(1)(c). 
(R., pp. 13-14.) Thus, all four counts charge a different type of touching and 
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invoke two different subsections of the relevant statute. These distinctions show 
that Knutsen committed four, not one, offenses. 
First, the counts charged under subsection (a) and those charged under 
subsection (c) both have elements different than the other, and therefore do not 
offend double jeopardy. Under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court of 
the United States, "the same act or transaction" may be prosecuted and 
punished under "two distinct statutory provisions" if "each provision requires proof 
of a fact which the other does not." Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (quoting Blockburger 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)). See also Vitale, 447 U.S. at 416 ("if each 
statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, the offenses 
are not the same under the 8/ockburger test" (internal quotations and citations 
omitted, emphasis original)). Here the two different statutes require proof of a 
fact the other does not. I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(a) requires proof the defendant 
"[c]ommit[ted] any lewd or lascivious act or acts" while I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(c) 
requires proof the defendant "[c]ause[d] or [had] sexual contact ... not amounting 
to lewd conduct as defined in paragraph (a)." Application of the Blockburger test 
shows that conviction and sentencing for two crimes for violating both I.C. § 18-
1505B(1)(a) and I.C. § 18-1505B(1)(c), based on two different and mutually 
exclusive types of sexual touching, do not infringe upon any double jeopardy 
rights. 
Second, Knutsen was not convicted for the same crime in any of the four 
counts, because each charged a different act of touching. The lewd and 
lascivious acts that violated subsection (a) were, respectively, Knutsen touching 
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V.M.'s genitals with his hand and having her touch his genitals with her hand. 
(R., pp. 13-14.) The sexual touching not amounting to lewd and lascivious 
conduct were separate acts of touching V.M.'s genitals with his foot and touching 
her breasts with his hands·. (R., p. 13.) There is nothing in the statute that would 
make these four separate acts of sexual touching one crime. No one of them is a 
lesser included offense of any other. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 
705-08 (1993) (holdings of prior cases finding double jeopardy "rest[] squarely 
upon the existence of a lesser included offense"). Acquittal on any count would 
not have required acquittal on any other, nor would conviction on any one count 
required conviction on any other. Because the legislature has not defined 
separate acts of sexual contact as a single crime, the four acts of sexual contact 
Knutsen perpetrated were not "the same offense" and therefore not within the 
scope of double jeopardy protections. 
Knutsen advances a legal standard by which "one continuing transaction" 
must be deemed the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 54.) This legal standard is not meaningfully distinguishable from the 
"same transaction rule" espoused by Justice Brennan, under which "all charges 
growing out of conduct constituting a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or 
transaction must be tried in a single proceeding." Brown, 432 U.S. at 170 
(Brennan, J. concurring) (internal quotes omitted). However, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has "steadfastly refused to adopt the 'single transaction' 
view of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 790; see also Dixon, 
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509 U.S. at 709 n.14 ("the same transaction rule ... has been consistently 
rejected by the Court"). 
As set forth above, the Court has continually held that the proper analysis 
is of legislative intent, with the starting point being that where the legislature 
criminalized the same conduct with different statutes, each having an element 
not found in the other, the legislature intended both statutes to apply such that 
they did not constitute the "same offense." 
In support of his argument that "part[s] of one continuing transaction" are 
the same offense for double jeopardy purposes Knutsen cites two cases, State v. 
Major, 111 Idaho 410, 725 P.2d 115 (1986), and State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 
725 P.2d 128 (1986). (Appellant's brief, p. 54.) In the latter case, the victim 
"testified that Estes had entered her room and forcibly raped her four times." 
Estes, 111 Idaho at 424, 725 P .2d at 129. On appeal Estes argued the "trial 
court erred by refusing to require the prosecution to elect which of the four acts of 
sexual intercourse forcibly committed upon [the victim] it would rely on in seeking 
to prove the crime of rape" because "Idaho Criminal Rule 8 requires that each 
crime be charged in a separate count." kl at 427, 725 P.2d at 132. At no point 
in the opinion does the court even mention double jeopardy, much less apply 
double jeopardy legal analysis. The Court's rejection of Estes' argument, finding 
no violation of I.C.R. 8 because that rule allows joinder of offenses constituting a 
common scheme, id., has no obvious relevance to this case. That four acts of 
rape could be pursued as one count without violating I.C.R. 8 does not 
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reasonably translate to a conclusion that punishing four acts of sexual abuse of a 
vulnerable adult as four offenses violates double jeopardy. 
The Major case is no more helpful to Knutsen. In that case Major 
challenged her conviction on a single count of grand theft by possession on two 
grounds: First that the state court lacked jurisdiction because she was an Indian 
and the crime occurred in Indian country and, second, that the amendment of the 
information to include the property later-recovered outside the reservation to the 
single count of grand theft violated I.C.R. 7(e). 111 Idaho at 412-13, 725 P.2d at 
117-18. Although this opinion at least mentions double jeopardy, id. at 414, 725 
P.2d at 119, there was no claim of a double jeopardy violation before the Court. 
Thus, any discussion of double jeopardy is, at best, dicta. 9 State v. Hawkins, 155 
Idaho 69, _, 305 P.3d 513, 518 (2013) (dicta is a statement "not necessary to 
decide the issue presented to the appellate court" and is "not controlling"). 
In deciding that the information was properly amended, the Court adopted 
a test used "in the context of deciding the propriety of aggregating several small 
larcenous acts into one charge of grand larceny," namely, whether the stolen 
items were "possessed as part of 'a single incident or pursuant to a common 
scheme or plan reflecting a single, continuing [criminal] impulse or 
9 In addition, the Court relied on and quoted State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69, 383 
P.2d 602, 606 (1963), for the proposition that "[w]hether a course of criminal 
conduct should be divided or aggregated depends on whether or not the conduct 
constituted 'separate, distinct and independent crimes."' Major, 111 Idaho at 
414,725 P.2d at 119. This part of Hall, however, was expressly overruled in 
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,211, 731 P.2d 192, 206 (1987), which applied a 
legal standard addressing whether the convictions were for included offenses. 
Thus, the dictum in Major is no longer good law for this reason also. 
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intent."' Major, 111 Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119 (brackets original, quoting 
State v. Lloyd, 103 Idaho 382, 383, 647 P.2d 1254, 1255 (1982)). The evidence 
showed that all the property in question was stolen from one individual at the 
same time, transported by Major and her associates off the reservation where 
one item was sold the a pawn shop, then the rest of the property was transported 
back to the reservation. Major, 111 Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119. The Court 
ultimately concluded that Major committed "but one offense" of possession of 
stolen property, and therefore "the amendment to the information adding the 
property recovered from the pawn shop under the same offense was 
permissible." ~ at 415, 725 P.2d at 120. Tellingly, at no point in Major, or in 
Lloyd, the case relied on, does the Court claim that the rule it ultimately applied, 
whereby the state may aggregate theft offenses, is of constitutional origin or 
significance. 
To show fundamental error Knutsen bears the burden of demonstrating a 
violation of unwaived constitutional rights, that the error is clear, and that the 
error is prejudicial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 
(2010). Knutsen has failed to show fundamental error because he has failed to 
show that under the correct constitutional standard there is error, much less clear 
and prejudicial error. Application of the double jeopardy legal standards as 
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States leads to the conclusion 
that the four counts were not the "same offense" because none is a lesser 
included of the others. There is thus no constitutional error, much less is that 
error clear on the record. 
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There is one opinion, not cited by Knutsen, that the state wishes to 
address. In State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 533, 300 P.3d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 
2013), the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "[c]onsistent with" Supreme Court 
precedent "it is generally held" that where "multiple acts against the same victim" 
occur "during a single criminal episode" the "'offense' is typically the episode" and 
not the individual acts that would "independently support a conviction for the 
same offense." This assertion does not withstand analysis because the 
conclusion that double jeopardy focuses on the "episode" instead of the "offense" 
is not "consistent with" Supreme Court precedent, and is in fact entirely 
inconsistent with that precedent. Even if this standard were the law, its 
application does not show fundamental error in this case. 
In Blockburger the defendant asserted that his convictions for two counts 
of the illegal sale of narcotics violated double jeopardy because they "constitute a 
single continuing offense" because they were "made to the same purchaser and 
following each other, with no substantial interval of time between the delivery of 
the drug in the first transaction and the payment for the second quantity sold." 
284 U.S. at 301-02.10 The Court rejected this argument, stating that because 
"the first sale was consummated," the second sale, "however closely following," 
was a "separate and distinct sale completed by its delivery." kl The Court 
distinguished between "a continuous offense, having duration," and "an offense 
consisting of an isolated act." kl at 302 (internal citations and quotations 
10 This analysis is in a different part of the opinion than the part generally cited for 
the "Blockburger test" for whether a single act may be subject to two criminal 
sanctions. 
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omitted). Because the statute in question did not criminalize "the business of 
selling the forbidden drugs," but instead "penalizes any sale made," "[e]ach of 
several successive sales constitute a distinct offense, however closely they may 
follow each other." kl "The test is whether the individual acts are prohibited or 
the course of action they constitute. If the former, then each act is punishable . 
separately. *** If the latter, there can be but one penalty." kl (internal quotes 
omitted, asterisks original). 
The analysis in Blockburger is clearly at odds with a general rule that the 
offense is generally the episode instead of the act. Rather, the offense is 
whatever the legislature has defined the offense as. If it has defined the offense 
as a course of action, the offense is a course of action. Where, as here, the 
offense is defined as a particular act, the offense is a particular act, and 
committing multiple prohibited acts in rapid succession against the same victim 
does not transform the legislative definition of the crime. 
The Court of Appeals' rule that committing multiple crimes against a single 
victim in rapid succession converts those crimes into a single offense for double 
jeopardy purposes is also not "consistent with the Brown analysis." Moffat, 154 
Idaho at 533, 300 P.3d at 65. The Brown analysis started with applying the 
Blockburger test and concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause "forbids 
successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser 
included offense." Brown, 432 U.S. at 169. 
The Court then turned to the Ohio court holding that because the date 
specified in the first charge was the last day of the joy ride (the date of his arrest) 
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while the date in the second charge was limited to the first day (the day he took 
the car), the "prosecutions are based on two separate acts ... , one of which 
occurred on November 29th and one which occurred on December 8th ." kl at 
164. The Court rejected the conclusion "Brown could be convicted of both 
crimes because the charges against him focused on different parts of this 9-day 
joyride." kl at 169. Because the applicable statutes made "the theft and 
operation of a single car a single offense," the Double Jeopardy implications 
could not be avoided by "the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a 
series of temporal or spacial units." kl In a subsequent case the Court pointed 
out that the "very same conduct" underlay both convictions for joyriding and 
automobile theft because "[e]very moment of [Brown']s conduct was as relevant 
to the joyriding charge as it was to the auto theft charge." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 
787. 
The analysis employed by the Supreme Court of the United States is 
clear. A conviction for two crimes cannot stand if the crimes are actually the 
"same offense" because the convictions are for included offenses. Offenses are 
not included offenses if they arise out of the same criminal act if each offense 
has an element not found in the other. Likewise, offenses are not included 
offenses if they arise from different criminal acts. 
Both of these analyses apply here, but particularly the latter. Knutsen 
perpetrated four different acts of sexual abuse under two statutory provisions. 
Each crime was proved by evidence of an independent act. The separate acts 
were not included offenses of each other and conviction on one did not mean 
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conviction on all, nor did acquittal on one mean acquittal on all. "Every minute 
that Nathaniel Brown drove or possessed the stolen automobile he was 
simultaneously committing both the lesser included misdemeanor and the greater 
felony, but the same simply is not true of [Knutsen].". lQ,_ at 789. It is not 
"consistent" with Brown, and is directly contrary to Blockburger, to mash separate 
criminal acts into one offense merely because they were perpetrated in rapid 
succession on the same victim. 
There is no constitutional requirement that this Court deem Knutsen's 
actions a single offense. It is the legislature's prerogative to define what 
constitutes an offense, and the legislature's definition did not create a course of 
conduct offense-it created a single act offense. Because each of Knutsen's 
acts was a separate offense, his convictions and sentences on four counts do not 
implicate double jeopardy, and he has failed to show fundamental error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
lower court. 
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